But the sting of the royal warrant abolishing purchase in the army lay
doubtless in the fact that it was only exercised after the consent of
Parliament had been previously asked, and (by the Lords) refused. And
if this humiliation had been put upon the House of Lords wantonly, and
without sufficient cause, the Government would have merited very
severe censure. But was there not a sufficient cause? In the first
place, the abolition of purchase was part of a large scheme, which
embraced, _inter alia_, a very liberal offer of compensation for the
extinction of the vested interests which the officers of the army had
illegally contracted. It seemed, therefore, more respectful to the
House of Commons, which was asked to vote the money, that the scheme
of the Government should be submitted to it in its integrity; and
there is no doubt, we apprehend, that if the House of Commons had met
the second reading of the bill by a vote similar to that which was
carried in the House of Lords, the Government would have bowed to the
decision. But the question assumed quite a different aspect after the
bill had been affirmed, in all its essential features, by decisive
majorities in the House of Commons. It was then in the power of the
Government to abolish purchase by royal warrant, and to send the bill,
thus disencumbered of its bone of contention, up to the House of
Lords. But the Lords would certainly have resented such treatment even
more indignantly than they did the subsequent rescinding of their
vote. So the bill was presented to them as it left the lower House;
and they met it, not by a direct negative, not even by an amendment
affirming the expediency of retaining the purchase system, but by a
motion for delay. The debate which followed, however, clearly showed
that the majority in the upper House were in reality fighting, not for
more information, but for the retention of the purchase system. The
consequence of yielding to their injudicious vote would therefore have
been simply the waste of a precious twelvemonth; for everybody
admitted that the purchase system was doomed, and could not survive
another year. But it would have been much more satisfactory if it
could have been abolished by Act of Parliament, for its resurrection
would have been a moral impossibility; whereas, as matters now stand,
it may be revived any moment by the same process which has for the
time destroyed it. This consideration alone seems to us to be a
sufficient justification for the course which the Government took. The
abolition of purchase by Act of Parliament was the more excellent way,
and the Government was right in trying it before availing itself of
its last resource in the royal warrant. And certainly the officers
are the last persons who ought to complain of what has been done; for
there can be little doubt that if the Government had begun by
abolishing purchase it would have found it hard, in the absence of a
_quid pro quo_, to persuade the House of Commons to sanction the
swollen estimates which compensation for over-regulation prices
necessitated. The Lords, too, if they would only consider the matter
calmly, would see reason to be grateful to a Government which has
rescued them from much obloquy and from a most dangerous agitation. It
is hardly an exaggeration to say that the rejection of the Ballot Bill
and of the Army Bill in one session would have gravely imperilled the
existence of the House of Lords, at least in its present form. But the
unavoidable mortification which the Government was compelled to
inflict upon it served to appease the public resentment, and even to
create a certain degree of sympathy in favour of our hereditary
legislators.