I herewith return House file No. 71, with my objections to
its becoming a law. A measure of this kind demands careful
and candid consideration, both because of its importance and
because of the acknowledged sincerity and high character of
those who favor it. There are certain reasons, however, why
I cannot approve such a measure at this time, and other
reasons why I cannot approve this particular bill. It is
desirable, in my judgment, that we act, so far as possible,
as if we were governed, restrained and guided by a
constitution adopted by ourselves. If we had a constitution
modeled after those of the States, an extraordinary
proposition like this would be submitted to the people. If
congress thinks woman suffrage wise, it has the power to
establish it. It is unfair to shift the responsibility on
the territory and then hold it responsible for alleged
imprudent legislation. I am assured the enactment of this
law will delay our claims to statehood, and in so critical a
period it is better that no pretext whatever be given for
such postponement. It is doubted by many if a majority of
the women of Dakota want the franchise. The point is made,
and a very good one, that the fact that one woman does not
want a right is not a justifiable reason for refusing it to
another who does, yet it must not be forgotten that the
enfranchisement of women confers not only a privilege but a
grave burden and responsibility. We condemn the man who
neglects to vote as recreant to his duty. If women are
enfranchised, the right conferred becomes an obligation as
imperious to them as to men; on those opposed as on those
who favor the act. I think the women of Dakota should have a
voice in determining whether they should assume this burden
or not. So much for the general proposition. There are two
other features of this bill which I can scarcely think
satisfactory to the advocates of woman suffrage themselves.
I am satisfied that they should appear in a measure claiming
to advance the rights of women. If the vote of a woman is
needed anywhere, it is in our cities. In many existing city
charters a distinct clause appears, providing that males
alone shall possess the qualifications of electors. In this
bill the word "male" is only stricken out of one chapter of
the code, leaving the disability still standing against
hundreds of women equally entitled to recognition. The women
of Sioux Falls, the women of Mitchell, the women of
Brookings, the women of Chamberlain, of Watertown and a
great many of the more important cities in southern Dakota,
would be disqualified from voting under these special
enactments, even though this bill became a law at this very
session. Charters have been created with that provision
retained, and they would make this bill abortive and largely
inoperative. A still more objectionable feature, and one
deliberately inserted, is the clause debarring women from
the right to hold office. If the word "male" had been
stricken out of the code, and no other action taken, they
would have been eligible, and I believe there is a wide
feeling that many offices, particularly those connected with
penal and benevolent institutions, could be most
appropriately filled with women, but this clause practically
forbids their appointment. If women are good enough to vote
they are good enough to be voted for. If they are qualified
to choose officials, they are qualified to be chosen. I
don't say that I would approve this measure were it
otherwise worded, but I certainly would not indorse a bill
which thus keeps the word of promise to the ear and breaks
it to the hope, which deliberately and avowedly debars and
disqualifies women while assuming to exalt and honor them.
These objections are apart from the abstract right of women
to the ballot, but they show how necessary it is to approach
such a subject with deliberation. If women are to be
enfranchised, let it be done, not as a thirty days' wonder,
but as a merited reform resulting from mature reflection,
approved by the public conscience and sanctioned by the
enlightened judgment of the people.